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SUMMARY
The U.S. Intelligence Community contin-
ues to adjust to the post-Cold War environ-
ment.  Congressional and executive branch
initiatives have emphasized enhancing cooper-
ation among the different agencies that com-
prise the Community by giving greater mana-
gerial authority to the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI). 
Priority continues to be placed on intelli-
gence support to military operations and on
involvement in efforts to combat narcotics
trafficking and, especially since September 11,
2001, international terrorism.  Growing con-
cerns about transnational threats are leading to
increasingly close cooperation between intelli-
gence and law enforcement agencies.  This
relationship is complicated, however, by differ-
ing roles and missions as well as statutory
charters.  
The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks,
for which no specific warning was available,
have led to increased emphasis on human
intelligence, better cooperation between law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, and on
consideration of organizational changes to the
Intelligence Community.
Intelligence Community leadership and
congressional committees have expressed
determination to enhance analytical capabili-
ties.  A major concern is an imbalance between
resources devoted to collection and those
allocated to analysis, with collected data much
exceeding analytical capabilities.  
In several regional crisis areas, the role of
the U.S. Intelligence Community is  especially
important.  Provisions for U.S. intelligence to
monitor security arrangements between Israelis
and Palestinians have been a significant factor
in efforts to resolve Middle East tensions.
Intelligence  efforts have also been important
in attempting to enforce U.N. sanctions on
Iraq and monitoring peace agreements in
Bosnia.  Cruise missile and bomb attacks on
Afghan targets in the campaign against the
Taliban, and on Serbian targets during the
Kosovo crisis have been heavily dependent
upon precise targeting data provided by intelli-
gence sensors.  The mistaken attack on the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade resulted from
faulty information provided by the Intelligence
Community.
A particular concern for many in Con-
gress has been the Intelligence Community’s
assessment of the missile attack capabilities of
foreign countries, especially North Korea.
Some believe that U.S. vulnerability to missile
attack may arrive sooner than has been esti-




The conference report (H.Rept. 107-328) on the FY2002 Intelligence Authorization bill
(H.R. 2883) was approved by the House on December 12, 2001, and by the Senate on
December 13.  The bill was signed into law on December 28, becoming P.L. 107-108.  In
signing the legislation, the President indicated deep concerns about a provision, Section
305, that would require written reports on intelligence successes and failures.
Although P.L. 107-108 did not include provisions in an earlier House version of the bill
to establish an independent commission to investigate the intelligence background of the
September 11 attacks, legislation (S. 1867) has recently been introduced to set up a National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks to undertake such a review.  Media reports also indicate
that one or both of the intelligence committees will conduct hearings regarding the
performance of the Intelligence Community in regard to the September attacks.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The end of the Cold War, now a decade past, continues to reverberate throughout the
United States Intelligence Community.  Since the beginning of the first Bush Administration,
intelligence agencies have been reduced in size (reportedly by some 30%) and priorities
shifted away from the Soviet Union and its erstwhile allies.  Yet the post-Cold War world has
its own complexities—political, economic, and technological—that continue to require the
attention of intelligence agencies.  The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
on September 11, 2001, dramatically demonstrated the changed nature of threats facing the
United States.  The Intelligence Community is challenged by the variety of topics on which
information is needed, changing technologies that may limit success in acquiring information,
and, not least, by temporary and not-so-temporary needs for expertise in many different
foreign languages.
Changes in the nature of the world beyond U.S. borders, the sole focus of intelligence
agencies, have required a shift in the purposes and goals of the Intelligence Community.
Gone is the relentless focus on Soviet submarines, missile silos, and conventional military
capabilities; new threats include terrorism, transfers of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(WMD), and political, ethnic, and social upheavals in a variety of regions.  Gone also is the
massive military infrastructure of the Soviet Union that could be observed by overhead
imagery platforms.  Intelligence agents must be able to move beyond contacts with foreign
government officials and tap into political sects and terrorist cells often having no perceptible
infrastructure.
As a result, some observers believe that intelligence agencies may be in for a period of
transition and adaptation exceeding the one that followed immediately upon the dissolution
of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.  In particular, it is argued that the three major
“INTs,” the major intelligence disciplines—signals intelligence (sigint), imagery intelligence
(imint), and human intelligence (humint)—will have to be fundamentally reinvented and this
process will have major technical and organizational ramifications.  There will have to evolve,
it is further argued, a coherent community-wide managerial structure that will respect the
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varied and changing needs of military and civilian intelligence consumers while keeping costs
within bounds and avoiding unnecessary duplication of effort.   Making some of these changes
may not save money, and may even require budgetary enhancements; according to this
argument, a failure to confront changed realities may result in substantial waste of the $27+
billion now invested in intelligence and intelligence-related activities.  
The events of September 11, 2001, persuaded many observers that there may a need for
a wide-ranging review of the organizational structure of the Intelligence Community.
Media reports in early November 2001 indicated that a review of the Intelligence Community
by an Administration panel, headed by former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft,
would recommend transferring three major intelligence agencies to the direct control of the
DCI and the separation of the DCI from day-to-day management of the CIA.  The conferees
on the FY2002 intelligence authorization bill indicated their conclusion that “today’s
intelligence structure is not suitable to address current and future challenges.”
Sigint collection is the responsibility of the National Security Agency (NSA) at Fort
Meade, Maryland.  Sigint operations are classified, but there is little doubt that the need for
intelligence on a growing variety of nations and groups that are increasingly using
sophisticated—and rapidly changing—encryption systems requires a far different sigint effort
than the one prevailing for several decades. In 1998 the House Intelligence Committee
concluded that “very large changes in the National Security Agency’s culture and method of
operations need to take place ....”  Some observers believe that an inevitable restructuring of
NSA will be required at the cost of many billions.  The Senate Intelligence Committee
acknowledged that “NSA’s core mission is an essential national capability, and must be
dramatically rejuvenated” but added that some new initiatives, already underway, will require
“a significant infusion of funds.”  Observers credit the current Director of NSA, Lt. Gen.
Michael Hayden, with launching a long-overdue reorganization of the Agency, but adapting
it to changed technological and geopolitical conditions will remain a significant challenge.
Several reports sponsored by the European Parliament have alleged that NSA operates
an international sigint collection effort, known as Echelon, that intercepts communications
worldwide in order to provide economic intelligence to U.S. corporations.  On July 5, 2000,
the European Parliament voted to undertake a further investigation of Echelon; the resultant
draft report on Echelon was made public on May 18, 2001.  Maintaining that NSA operates
in accordance with existing statutes and executive orders, senior U.S. officials have strongly
disputed claims that intelligence agencies assist U.S. corporations competing with foreign
firms.  They acknowledge, however, that intelligence agencies collect information regarding
the use of bribery and other illegal efforts by foreign firms in competition with U.S.
corporations.  Indications of such foreign efforts are provided to the State and Commerce
Departments.  (See CRS Report RS20444, Project Echelon: U.S. Electronic Surveillance
Efforts, by Richard A. Best, Jr.)
A second major intelligence discipline, imagery or imint is also facing profound changes.
Imagery is collected in essentially three ways, satellites, manned aircraft, and unmanned aerial
vehicles (UAVs). (See CRS Report 98-495, Intelligence Collection Platforms: Satellites,
Manned Aircraft, and UAVs, by Michael F. Miller and Richard A. Best, Jr., May 21, 1998.)
The satellite program that covered Soviet Union and acquired highly accurate intelligence of
submarines, missiles, bombers and other military targets is perhaps the greatest achievement
of the U.S. Intelligence Community.  The demise of the Soviet Union and experience in the
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Persian Gulf War have indicated that there is likely to be a greater number of collection
targets than in the Cold War and that more maneuverable satellites may be required.  At the
same time, the advent of high-quality commercial satellite imagery has raised many questions
about whether at least some coverage can be obtained less expensively from the private
sector.  (See the discussion of India’s nuclear tests below.)  Concern has been widely
expressed, especially in November 1999 House floor debates, that imagery architecture is
unbalanced, that acquiring collection platforms has been emphasized at the expense of
analytical and dissemination efforts. 
Imagery as a collection discipline has been affected by the establishment in 1996 of the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) to manage imagery processing and
dissemination to national decision makers and combat commanders.  NIMA is composed of
agencies with disparate backgrounds, including the Defense Mapping Agency, which was
never a member of the Intelligence Community.  Inevitably, there have been start-up
problems, especially in terms of financial management. 
Manned aircraft—the U-2 and other aircraft used by the services for tactical intelligence
collection—remain important sources of imagery.  The SR-71, which flew at very high
altitudes, has been retired, and no replacement is apparently envisioned.  The U-2s, the
earliest of which were procured in the 1950s, are being upgraded with new interception
capabilities and new navigational equipment, but some observers express concern that a
follow-on will not be available because of a questionable assumption that they can be
completely replaced with unmanned aerial vehicles. Limited inventories of airborne platforms
that are in high demand have led some industry officials to suggest business-class jets
equipped with a number of sensors for use in military missions.
UAV procurement has been a continuing source of difficulties.  Some UAVs were used
during the Vietnam War, the advantages of these pilotless craft have been more generally
appreciated in the last decade or so when they have been equipped with electro-optical
devices and real-time communications.  Since the Persian Gulf War, they have been widely
recognized as relatively inexpensive sources of tactical imagery that do not place the lives of
U.S. personnel at risk; they have been widely used to monitor peacekeeping operations in
Bosnia.  UAV procurement efforts, however, have been beset by problems.  Several systems
have been canceled after millions of dollars were spent without producing operational
platforms.  The UAV effort has been perceived by many in Congress as lacking in focus and
unable to meet operational requirements.  The Global Hawk UAV, currently undergoing
testing, is the most promising approach to obtaining a high-altitude, long-endurance
unmanned platform; see CRS Report RL30727, Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance &
Reconnaissance (ISR): The U-2 Aircraft and Global Hawk UAV Programs, by Christopher
Bolkcom and Richard A. Best, Jr.  The House versions of the Intelligence Authorization bill
for FY2002 directed a full-scale review of requirements for reconnaissance aircraft.
A long-standing criticism of the Intelligence Community’s imint effort has been an
imbalance between collection and analysis:  that far more imagery is collected than can ever
be evaluated with large quantities remaining “on the cutting room floor.”  Intelligence budgets
moreover reflect an emphasis on the procurement of collection systems with fewer resources
allocated to processing and analysis.  Some also argue that priority is given to the concerns
of operational military forces rather than to matters of interest to senior political leaders, e.g.,
it has been alleged that in 1995 imagery analysts were concentrating on Serb air defenses to
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an extent that delayed finding evidence of mass grave sites of acute interest to the State
Department.  The House intelligence committee has concluded that, “the emphasis on
collection at the expense of downstream activities [i.e., processing and analysis] permeates
the [Intelligence Community] at all levels and in most collection disciplines.”  During House
consideration of FY2000 intelligence authorization legislation, concern for a better balance
between collection and analysis was reiterated; Representative Lewis stated in the floor
debate on November 9, 1999: “In this bill, Congress has told the administration enough is
enough.  We have said that, unless there is a plan implemented that will process the satellite
data ..., we will not buy the satellite system as currently proposed.” 
Intelligence from human contacts—humint—is the oldest intelligence discipline and the
one that is most often written about in the media. (Humint collection is to be distinguished
from covert actions although they may on occasion involve the same agents; see CRS Report
96-844, Covert Action: An Effective Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy?, by Richard A. Best,
Jr.)  The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which is responsible for most humint collection,
had important successes during the Cold War; disaffected Soviets and others provided
invaluable help in providing information about weapons programs and political intentions that
were not obtainable from any other source.  In large measure, targets of U.S. humint
collection during the Cold War were government officials and military leaders.  Intelligence
agency officials working under cover as diplomats could approach such potential contacts at
receptions or in the context of routine embassy business.  Today, however, the challenge is
making contacts with influential figures in heretofore obscure third world states, clandestine
groups, or narcotics traffickers who speak a variety of foreign languages.  Humint regarding
such sources can be especially important as there may be little evidence of activities or
intentions that can be gathered from imagery and their communications may be carefully
limited. 
Contacts with such persons usually cannot be made in the course of embassy business
or in diplomatic receptions; in many cases contacts between a U.S. embassy and terrorist
figures or narcotics smugglers would be unacceptable to either side.  Placing U.S. intelligence
officials in foreign countries under “non-official cover”—in businesses or other private
capacities—is possible but it presents significant challenges to the agencies.  Administrative
mechanisms are vastly more complicated; special arrangements have to be made for pay,
allowances, retirement, and healthcare.  The responsibilities of operatives under non-official
cover to the parent intelligence agency have to be reconciled with those to private employers
and there is an unavoidable potential for many conflicts of interest or even corruption.  Any
involvement with terrorist groups or smugglers has an inevitable potential for major
embarrassment to the U.S. government and, of course, physical danger to those immediately
involved.  
Responding to allegations in the early-1990s that CIA agents may have been involved
too closely with narcotics smugglers and human rights violators in Central America, the then-
DCI, John Deutch, established guidelines in 1995 (which remain classified) to govern the
recruitment of informants with unsavory backgrounds.  Although CIA officials maintain that
no proposal for contacts with persons having potentially valuable information has been
disapproved, there is a widespread belief that the guidelines serve to encourage a “risk
averse” atmosphere at a time when information on terrorist plans, from whatever source, is
urgently sought.  Section 903 of the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56), enacted October 26,
2001, expressed the sense of Congress that intelligence officials “should be encouraged, and
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should make every effort, to establish and maintain intelligence relationships with any person,
entity, or group” to acquire information on terrorist groups.  The FY2002 Intelligence
Authorization Act (P.L. 107-108) directs the DCI to rescind and replace the guidelines.
Another problem is the availability of personnel trained in appropriate languages.  Cold
War efforts required a supply of linguists in a relatively finite number of foreign languages,
but in recent years the Intelligence Community has needed experts in a wider range of more
obscure languages and dialects.  Various approaches have been considered:  use of civilian
contract personnel, military reservists with language qualifications, and substantial bonuses
for agency personnel who maintain their proficiency.  The House Intelligence Committee has
called for consideration of the establishment of a new Intelligence Community language
training facility and for language proficiency requirements for intelligence analysts.
A fourth INT, measurement and signatures analysis—masint, has received greater
emphasis in recent years.  A highly technical discipline, masint involves the application of
more complicated analytical refinements to information collected by sigint and imint sensors.
It also includes spectral imaging by which the identities and characteristics of objects can be
identified on the basis of their reflection and absorption of light.  A key problem has been
retaining personnel with expertise in masint systems who are offered more remunerative
positions in private industry. 
In the current geopolitical environment, another category of information, open source
information–osint (newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, books, radio, television, and Internet
Web sites),  is increasingly important.  Whereas the Soviet Union was a tightly closed society
with access difficult to come by, most (but not all) countries of interest today are far more
open in their media.  A much greater proportion of information can thus be obtained without
the use of human agents or sophisticated collection platforms.  At the same time,
requirements for translation, dissemination, and systematic analysis may even have increased,
given the multitude of different areas and the volume of materials.  Most observers believe
that intelligence agencies should be more aggressive in using osint; some believe that the
availability of osint may even reduce the need for certain collection efforts.   The availability
of osint also raises questions regarding the need for intelligence agencies to undertake
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information that could be directly obtained by user
agencies.  
Radically restructuring the “INTs” will be difficult, given the amounts of money that will
probably be involved and the large and complex organizations whose primary responsibilities
will be affected.  By law, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), currently George Tenet,
has the authority to set priorities and propose budgets for all agencies in the U.S. Intelligence
Community.  In reality, however, most DCIs have concentrated most of the attention to the
one agency over which they have direct control, the CIA, and have limited their attempts to
exert managerial control of other intelligence agencies, most of which are part of the
Department of Defense (DOD), viz. the National Security Agency, the National
Reconnaissance Office, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency, and the Defense
Intelligence Agency.  
Whether the statutory authorities of the DCI are adequate is subject to debate; proposals
to transfer all intelligence agencies to the operational control of the DCI have not gained
pervasive support in either the executive or legislative branches.  The budgetary authorities
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of the DCI, enhanced in the Intelligence Authorization Act of FY1997 (P.L. 104-293), allow
him to prepare a consolidated national intelligence budget that in turn permits making
tradeoffs among different INTs and programs before budgets are submitted to Congress.  This
authority, however, can realistically be exercised only with the cooperation of the Defense
Department, given the location of intelligence agencies within DOD and the enormous
influence exercised by the Pentagon over intelligence spending.  Although extensive
readjustments have been made by Congress, some argue that they could be more efficiently
undertaken within the executive branch.
The widespread use of computers and new communications systems means that although
there is a greater need for coordinating the INTs at the Washington level, intelligence
products are used at many different levels of government and that quite low-level users can
access information from Washington-area agencies.  In addition, there has been increased
availability of tactical intelligence collectors—sigint systems, aircraft and UAVs—that are
operated by military commanders who are also the immediate recipients of the information
acquired.  Some observers express concern about excessive emphasis on tactical intelligence,
arguing that national priorities may be downgraded.  Others note, on the other hand, that
organizational structures, traditionally focused on providing information from each “INT” to
the Washington agency in charge of that “INT” (a practice known as “stove piping”) do not
adequately serve current needs of military commanders.  Observers suggest that there will be
increasing needs to share national and tactical intelligence and for organizational and
individual flexibility.
Another issue is funding.  Some alternatives to current platforms and procedures may
produce cost savings, but observers suspect that they may be outweighed by increases found
necessary in other areas.  Satellites will remain high-cost programs, greater numbers of UAV
systems and human collectors will have to be supported and trained.  Observers generally
expect that intelligence activities will probably continue to absorb some 10% of the defense
budget in any given year.  It is uncertain whether such percentages will be adequate to
accommodate major changes in NSA’s operations, the acquisition of additional imagery
platforms, and a reorganized humint effort.  
Although much of the restructuring that arguably is required could be accomplished by
executive branch initiative, Congress remains responsible for appropriations and for oversight.
Even at a time of budgetary surpluses, significant increases in intelligence spending will have
to be balanced against other national priorities.  In recent years Congress has emphasized the
need for expanded humint capabilities and has insisted upon a major role in the acquisition of
new imagery collection platforms.  Other concerns—and directives—are undoubtedly
expressed in the classified annexes to intelligence authorization bills.  Even if Congress and
the leadership of the Intelligence Community concur on the need for major changes in these
and other areas, ensuring the reorienting of long-established organizations is a difficult task.
Implementation of other changes enacted in 1996 remains an ongoing process.  In May
1998, Joan Dempsey, a career intelligence official, was confirmed by the Senate to fill the
newly established position of Deputy DCI for Community Management. Two other positions,
designated as requiring Senate confirmation, have been filled without formal Senate action
as a result of an understanding reached between the Administration and the Senate
Intelligence Committee.  
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For budgetary purposes, intelligence spending is divided between the National Foreign
Intelligence Program (NFIP), which covers Washington-based agencies and Tactical
Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) (also known as intelligence-related activities),
which covers programs supporting the operating units of the armed services, and the Joint
Military Intelligence Program (JMIP), which covers programs, not-necessarily tactical, that
are of primary concern to the Defense Department.  Jurisdiction over these programs is
somewhat different in the House and the Senate, but in both chambers members of both
intelligence and armed services committees are involved in oversight efforts.  
For a number of years some Members have sought to make public total amounts of
intelligence and intelligence-related spending; floor amendments for that purpose were
defeated in both chambers during the 105th Congress. In response, however, to a lawsuit filed
under the Freedom of Information Act, DCI Tenet stated on October 15, 1997 that the
aggregate amount appropriated for intelligence and intelligence-related activities for FY1997
was $26.6 billion.  He added that the Administration would continue “to protect from
disclosure any and all subsidiary information concerning the intelligence budget.”  In March
1998, DCI Tenet announced that the FY1998 figure was $26.7 billion.  Figures for FY1999
have not been released and the Administration has thus far prevailed against legal efforts to
force release of intelligence spending figures.  On May 23, 2000, the House voted 175-225
to defeat an amendment calling for annual release of an unclassified statement on aggregate
intelligence spending.  Some have suggested that if intelligence spending totals were made
public it would no longer be necessary to “hide” intelligence programs within the Defense
Department budget; national programs at least could broken out and consolidated under the
DCI and the two intelligence committees.  Others contend that the current system ensures that
national intelligence programs are closely related to military operations and are considered
in conjunction with defense programs.
A significant concern continues to be the need to provide intelligence support to
operating military forces.  In 1997, the House intelligence committee noted that
“intelligence is now incorporated into the very fiber of tactical military operational activities,
whether forces are being utilized to conduct humanitarian missions or are engaged in full-scale
combat.”  The Persian Gulf War demonstrated the importance of intelligence from both
tactical and national systems, including satellites that had been previously directed almost
entirely at Soviet facilities.  There were, nonetheless, numerous technical difficulties,
especially in transmitting data in usable formats and in a timely manner.  Many of these issues
have since been addressed with congressional support, but many observers believe that
significant technical and organizational challenges remain.  Among issues of concern are
capabilities to disseminate imagery rapidly, the procurement and use of unmanned aerial
vehicles (both tactical and high altitude) and manned reconnaissance aircraft, along with
associated sensors and communications systems.  Expressing concern about “substantial
mismanagement and lack of communication,” the Senate Intelligence Committee has called
for a report identifying “specific actions that have been taken or are being taken to enhance
cooperation between Department of Defense and the Intelligence Community by improving
the provision, handling, and use of intelligence information in preparation for, during, and
after battle.” 
Making usable intelligence available to military commanders in a timely fashion has been
a principal preoccupation of the Intelligence Community since the Persian Gulf War.  Further
efforts will undoubtedly be necessary, given the Defense Department’s increasing emphasis
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on “dominant battlefield awareness” as reflected in Joint Vision 2010 and the Quadrennial
Defense Review (QDR).  Operational concepts now under consideration in the Department
of Defense (DOD) clearly will require even greater intelligence support for precision
targeting, bomb damage assessment, and other purposes.  The House committee noted,
however, that the QDR did not project increased intelligence funding, and, in fact, called for
the reduction in the procurement rate of the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar
System (JSTARS) aircraft.  The Senate committee also noted inadequate manned
reconnaissance platforms and indicated a need for a long-term airborne reconnaissance
recapitalization plan. 
The House intelligence committee has given special attention to weaknesses in analysis,
expressing concern about “a largely inexperienced workforce; lack of language skills and
limited in-country familiarity ...; and a predominant focus on current intelligence that is
eroding the [Intelligence Community’s] ability to conduct comprehensive strategic analysis.”
The bureaucratic tendency to emphasize current intelligence over long-term analysis has been
noted for many years.  It has been enhanced by the shift from enduring targets such as the
Soviet Union to the disparate and fluctuating concerns of the post-Cold War period.  The
House committee advocates the establishment of core groups of analysts to undertake
research-oriented projects aimed at assessing strategic issues.  It further expressed support
for a civilian intelligence reserve program that would utilize the expertise of former
intelligence officials as well as civilian experts and linguists.  Provisions authorizing
competitive analysis of intelligence products having national importance and for quadrennial
intelligence reviews to complement the Quadrennial Defense Review were included in the
FY1999 Intelligence Authorization Act.
The Intelligence Community’s failure to provide advance notice of India’s nuclear tests
in May 1998 produced searching reviews of analytical efforts and capabilities both in the
executive branch and  Congress.  The initial review, undertaken by Admiral David Jeremiah,
former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has not been made public, but in a press
conference Admiral Jeremiah described his conclusions.  Although the Indian government that
took office in late March 1998 had indicated its intention to “exercise the option to induct
[sic] nuclear weapons,” most observers believed that India would conduct a lengthy
assessment prior to undertaking tests.  Admiral Jeremiah concluded that “both the intelligence
and policy communities had an underlying mindset going into these tests that the BJP [the
party heading the new Indian government] would behave as we behave.”  The Indians also
undertook various efforts to mask their intentions and to hide their test preparations.  The
Intelligence Community provided more detailed information on the follow-on Pakistani tests.
Admiral Jeremiah called for more rigor in analysts’ thinking and urged that outside
experts be brought into the analytical process.  There is, he maintained, a need for “greater
collaboration and coordination of intelligence agencies and disciplines.”  There is also, he
pointed out, an imbalance between the vast quantities of imagery collected and limits on
numbers of analysts.  “In everyday language, that means there is an awful lot of stuff on the
cutting room floor at the end of the day that we have not seen.”  In essence, Jeremiah
concluded that the DCI needs to ensure greater coordination among intelligence agencies in
regard both to collection and analysis.   
DCI Tenet has stated that he accepts all of Admiral Jeremiah’s recommendations.
Appreciating that no system can prevent any future intelligence surprise or “failure,” many
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observers believe that inadequate coordination may have contributed significantly to the
inability to monitor Indian nuclear efforts more closely.  (See CRS Report 98-672, U.S.
Intelligence and India’s Nuclear Tests: Lessons Learned, by Richard A. Best, Jr.)
Further concerns about the quality of intelligence analysis resulted from the North
Korean launch of a three-stage Taepo Dong 1 missile on August 31, 1998.  The
Intelligence Community had long anticipated a two-stage Taepo Dong missile launch, but its
capability to be used as a space launch vehicle with potential for striking some U.S. territory
was unexpected.  
Some observers have also criticized the conclusions reached by the Intelligence
Community regarding the pharmaceutical plant in the Sudan that the U.S. attacked on
August 20, 1998.  Administration officials indicated confidence in information linking the
plant to the production of chemical weapons, but outside observers remain skeptical.  In May
1999 the U.S. Treasury unfroze the assets of the Saudi businessman who owns the Sudanese
facility, an action some observers describe as a tacit admission that the U.S. struck the wrong
target.  Nonetheless, a lawsuit was filed in a U.S. federal court in July 2000 by the
businessman.
Congress remains concerned with the potential for abuses by intelligence agency
personnel and has addressed the question of whistleblower protection for officials working
in intelligence agencies who may not be covered by other whistleblower legislation.  The
FY1999 Intelligence Authorization Act established procedures by which an intelligence
agency official (or contractor) who seeks to provide information to Congress with respect to
an urgent concern would first report such concern to the inspector general of his or her
agency.  The IG in turn would forward the information to the agency head within 14 days.
The agency head would then forward it to the congressional intelligence committees within
7 days.  If the IG does not transmit the information (or does so inaccurately) the complainant
could forward it to the intelligence committees directly if the agency head is notified.   The
conference report noted that “an intelligence committee Member or staff employee receiving
such complaints or information must abide by the rules of the intelligence committees.”
Encryption remains an important legislative concern that has significant intelligence
implications.  Given advances in technology that may make obsolete the current controls on
the export of encryption systems, bills have been introduced in both the House and the Senate
to create a new regulatory framework.  One proposal, H.R. 850, would loosen export
controls on sophisticated encryption systems.  Officials in intelligence and law enforcement
agencies have expressed concerns that such liberalization would serve to provide protection
to the communications of international terrorists and rogue states.  The Senate Intelligence
Committee expressed concern in May 1999 that loosening export restrictions “may severely
damage the Intelligence Community’s ability to perform its SIGINT mission.”  On July 15,
1999, the House Intelligence Committee unanimously adopted an amendment to H.R. 850
that would provide broader grounds for the President to control exports of encryption; see
the Intelligence Committee’s report, Encryption for the National Interest Act, H.Rept. 106-
117, Part 5.   In September the Administration announced changes to its encryption policy
making products exportable (after a technical review) to any country except seven terrorist
states.  A request for comments on an interim final rule revising regulations on the export of
encryption items was published on January 14, 2000 (65FR2492-2502). (For further
background on the encryption question, see CRS Issue Brief IB96039, Encryption
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Technology: Congressional Issues, and CRS Report 98-905, The Encryption Debate:
Intelligence Aspects, by Keith G. Tidball and Richard A. Best, Jr.)
With growing concerns about terrorism, U.S. policymakers have become increasingly
concerned about transnational threats, including narcotics smuggling, terrorism, and especially
the possibility that terrorist groups might obtain access to weapons of mass destruction.
Since such transnational threats are often best dealt with in law enforcement channels, greater
cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies has been encouraged in
recent years.  This cooperation has raised a number of difficult issues: potential duplication
of effort, the use of information obtained by intelligence agencies in court trials, the danger
that the methods of covert intelligence collectors might be used routinely in law enforcement
cases, the undermining of legitimate foreign policy and defense initiatives.  (For additional
background, see CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering
Transnational Threats to the U.S., by Richard A. Best, Jr.)
Concern that information from both law enforcement and intelligence agencies may not
be reaching those responsible for dealing with international terrorist threats has grown since
the incidents of September 11, 2001.  Much information about Osama bin Laden and the al
Qaeda network was accumulated for trials of individuals connected with the 1993 World
Trade Center attack and an aborted January 2000 attack on the Los Angeles airport.  Critics
charge that much of this information was not made available to intelligence agencies, and
some of that which was available may not have been thoroughly exploited.  Further, some
argue that information available to intelligence agencies was not shared with the law
enforcement agencies that could have apprehended (because of immigration violations) some
of those involved in the September 11 attacks.  Anti-terrorism legislation (enacted as P.L.
107-56) was designed to facilitate the greater sharing of information available to law
enforcement agencies (including grand jury testimony) with the Intelligence Community in
accordance with guidelines to be established by the executive branch.
Congress also remains concerned about intelligence support provided to the
government’s counter-narcotics effort.  The Explanatory Statement accompanying the
FY1998 intelligence authorization conference report expressed concern about funding the
National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC) through the National Foreign Intelligence
Program inasmuch as NDIC functions within the Department of Justice.  Nonetheless, NDIC
funding has continued to be incorporated in defense authorization and appropriation acts.
FY2002 intelligence authorization legislation provides NDIC with $44 million and the
accompanying report indicates satisfaction with NDIC’s recent performance.
In February 2000, the Clinton Administration announced the establishment of an
interagency Counter Drug Intelligence Coordinating Group composed of representatives
of major federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies.  The Group’s responsibility will
be to ensure coordination in the narcotics intelligence efforts of federal departments and
agencies.  An interagency staff, the Counterdrug Intelligence Executive Secretariat, with some
30 personnel has been created to support the Group and roles and missions have been
assigned to the four major national narcotics intelligence centers–the DCI’s Crime and
Narcotics Center (CNC), the National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), the El Paso
Intelligence Center (EPIC), and the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCen).
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Although most observers acknowledge the need for close coordination among
intelligence and law enforcement agencies in regard to narcotics intelligence, some questions
exist about the implications of the creation of this interagency structure for the DCI’s
statutory responsibilities for the national intelligence effort.  Questions also remain concerning
policy guidelines and procedures for the use of intelligence information for law enforcement
purposes.  Concern has also been expressed about the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in
support of counter-narcotics efforts in South America, with some observers expressing
concern about the value of the contribution and others noting the danger of involving the U.S.
in local insurrections fueled by drug money. Others have pointed to the dangers involved in
U.S. intelligence officials or contractors providing intelligence to foreign countries who use
this data to attack suspicious civilian aircraft.  Section 1012 of the FY1995 Defense
Authorization Act (P.L. 103-337) provided official immunity for U.S. agents involved in
authorized support to foreign counter-narcotics efforts, but some observers call for a review
of the whole policy in light of the April 2001 attack by a Peruvian aircraft on a missionary
plane with the loss of two lives.
For some years concerns have been expressed about issues of secrecy and
classification.  Some argue that classification and declassification authorities and procedures
should be more closely based in statutory law.  Others believe that far too much government
information is classified and withheld from the public, especially given the end of the Cold
War.  A Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy, chaired by Senator
Moynihan, recommended in 1997 a series of measures to establish the basic principles of
security classification and declassification.  These measures were incorporated in legislation
introduced in the 105th Congress (H.R. 1546/S. 712), but the bills did not receive floor
consideration in either chamber.  Similar legislation (S. 22) was introduced in the 106th
Congress and eventually incorporated into the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2001
(P.L. 106-567).  (For additional background, see CRS Report 98-298, Managing Secrecy:
Security Classification Reform—the Government Secrecy Act Proposal, by Harold C.
Relyea.)
Other provisions of the FY2001 intelligence authorization bill would have established
criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of properly classified information.
Previous legislation established penalties only for disclosure of specific types of classified
material, e.g. codes and cryptographic devices and information related to nuclear programs.
Proponents of the provision maintained that recent leaks of highly sensitive intelligence
information have not only risked the loss of valuable collection capabilities but also
jeopardized important security interests.  Critics argued that the provisions in H.R. 4392 were
overly broad and would preclude the type of leaks that in the past have ultimately benefitted
the public.  The bill was vetoed by President Clinton on November 4, 2000, and another
version (H.R. 5630) with the unauthorized disclosure provisions deleted was enacted on
December 27, 2000, as P.L. 106-567.  
Consideration was given to including similar provisions in FY2002 legislation, but
Attorney General Ashcroft requested that the Administration be given time for a thorough
interagency study of the need for legislation to provide additional protections against
unauthorized disclosures of  classified information.  Accordingly, FY2002 intelligence
authorization legislation provides that such a review be conducted by the executive branch
and a reported submitted to Congress by May 1, 2002.
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CIA and the Israeli-Palestinian Accord.  The accord between Israeli and
Palestinian leaders (known as the Wye River Memorandum) signed in Washington on October
23, 1998, provided for a Trilateral Security Committee composed of high-ranking Israeli,
Palestinian, and U.S. officials to oversee the implementation of the agreement and coordinate
efforts to combat terror and terrorist organizations.  Media accounts indicated that, as a result
of ongoing efforts by CIA officials to assist in the establishment of security arrangements,
both the Israeli and Palestine leadership supported a more formal role for the Agency.
The accord assumes that CIA officials will continue liaison efforts, which have been
ongoing for several years, to improve communications between the two sides on security
matters and to enhance the professionalism of Palestinian security forces.  According to DCI
Tenet, however, CIA officials would not interpose themselves between the two sides, conduct
interrogations, or assume a direct role on the ground.  Some observers expressed concern that
CIA officials might become responsible for making judgments as to whether “violations” had
occurred, a responsibility that, holders of this view maintain, should be reserved to
policymakers.  With the deterioration of Israeli-Palestinian relations in the spring of 2001,
media reports indicate that the CIA role has been reduced.  DCI Tenet visited the region in
June, but CIA-sponsored meetings between Israeli and Palestinian security officials have been
unproductive.
In the final stages of negotiations of the Wye Accord, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu
pressed President Clinton to pardon Jonathan Pollard, a former Navy Intelligence analyst,
who was convicted of spying on behalf of Israel in 1986. Subsequent Israeli leaders have also
pressed Pollard’s case.  Media reports indicate that many Intelligence Community officials,
including DCI Tenet, strongly oppose any presidential pardon and opposition has been
expressed by Members of both intelligence committees.  (See  CRS Report RS20001,
Jonathan Pollard: Background and Considerations for Presidential Clemency, by Richard
A. Best, Jr. and Clyde Mark.)
The Intelligence Community and Iraq.  Persisting difficulties between the United
States and Iraq present major challenges to intelligence agencies.  Collecting information
about the secretive Iraqi regime is difficult enough, but devising a covert strategy to remove
Saddam Husayn from power has proven thus far to be insurmountable.  According to
information available in the media, intelligence agencies have had little success in penetrating
Iraqi leadership circles.  Intelligence agencies supported the efforts of U.N. inspectors
charged with determining Iraqi compliance with U.N. resolutions requiring Iraq to end any
programs for the acquisition or deployment of weapons of mass destruction, but such efforts
have been resisted by the Iraqi government.  There are, in addition, allegations that U.S.
intelligence officials may have improperly interfered with U.N. inspector teams.  The United
States openly seeks a new regime in Bagdad and funding has reportedly been included for
covert assistance to opposition elements in recent legislation, but intelligence agency officials
are reportedly skeptical of providing aid to any of the existing groups working against
Saddam.  (See CRS Report RS20843, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, by Kenneth
Katzman; also, CRS Issue Brief IB94049 Iraq-U.S. Confrontation: 1997-1999, by Alfred
Prados and Kenneth Katzman.)
The Intelligence Community and Missile Defense.  A key Cold War-era
intelligence  mission that endures in the post-Cold War era is collection targeted at foreign
missile capabilities, especially those capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction
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(WMD).  As noted above, the unanticipated North Korean testing of the Taepo Dong 1
missile raised questions about intelligence collection capabilities.  In addition, the July 1998
report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States (known
as the Rumsfeld Commission) concluded: “A new strategic environment now gives emerging
ballistic missile powers the capacity, through a combination of domestic development and
foreign assistance, to acquire the means to strike the U.S. within about five years of a decision
to acquire such a capability (10 years in the case of Iraq).  During several of those years, the
U.S. might not be aware that such a decision had been made.  Available alternative means of
delivery can shorten the warning time of deployment nearly to zero.”  Although more
pessimistic than much-criticized Intelligence Community estimates, this assessment
underscored the vital importance of intelligence efforts in this area, especially given its key
role in the debate over missile defense systems.
Kosovo/Operation Allied Force.  The highly successful airstrikes against Serbian
military targets, the centerpiece of Operation Allied Force, taxed U.S. intelligence capabilities.
Intelligence enabled NATO to use precision munitions to destroy Serbian targets with no
NATO combat casualties and with relatively limited losses of civilian lives.  Nonetheless,
some observers suggest that difficulties in relaying targeting data, the need for
communications “work arounds,” and escalating requirements for additional aircraft reflect
a serious failure in the years since the Persian Gulf War to address increased requirements for
imagery collection platforms for use in conjunction with precision guided munitions.
In addition to uncertainties about the future government satellite programs, critics note
that DOD has been unable to acquire significant numbers of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)
as a result of the managerial problems that have long been subjects of congressional censure.
Further, they cite the absence of plans for follow-ons to U-2 aircraft, first developed in the
Eisenhower Administration, as well as a limited inventory of JSTARS aircraft with ground-
radar capabilities.  The FY2000 Defense Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-79) provided an
increase of $15 million for the Global Hawk UAV program and requested studies on UAVs
and other “low density/high demand” platforms.  (See CRS Report RL30727, Airborne
Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR): The U-2 Aircraft and Global Hawk
UAV Programs, by Richard A. Best, Jr. and Christopher Bolkcom, updated December 1,
2000.)  Testing of the Global Hawk continues; in April 2001 the test vehicle flew from
California to Australia non-stop.
Further decisions on UAVs and manned reconnaissance aircraft, including the Air
Force’s U-2s and the Navy’s P-3's, are likely to be made in the context of FY2001 budget
decisions.  Some observers express concern that investment in new and upgraded
reconnaissance platforms may be  inadequate in light of the high tempo of operations that may
occur in the next decade.
According to official accounts, the mistaken attack on the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
on May 7, 1999, resulted from the use of outdated maps and databases.  The Yugoslav
Federal Directorate of Supply and Procurement, a military supply facility, was the intended
target, but it was confused with a nearby and similarly-sized building that was actually China’s
embassy.  Although embassies were on “no-strike” lists for Operation Allied Force, along
with hospitals, churches, and mosques, U.S. databases did not reflect the location of the
current Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.  Secretary of Defense William Cohen subsequently
announced several steps to prevent future targeting errors; the State Department will be
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responsible for reporting to the Intelligence Community whenever embassies move or new
embassies are built, new procedures for developing target information, including procedures
for updating maps will be established, and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) will establish new rapid response procedures
for updating critical databases for no-strike targets.
Official spokesmen, without excusing the error, have noted the daunting challenge of
maintaining a current and accurate database for a city the size of Belgrade.  They also note
the fact that imagery and mapping efforts, largely the responsibility of NIMA, have been
affected by resource cuts in the last few years.  In May 1998, the House Intelligence
Committee severely criticized NIMA’s management and financial accounting: “The
Committee is concerned that NIMA either simply does not want to tell Congress of its
dealings, or it simply doesn’t know how money is being spent and managed.  Neither option
is good.  Generally, the committee is skeptical regarding whether NIMA has the ability to
forecast, manage, and execute its budget.” DCI Tenet subsequently acknowledged in
congressional testimony that, “We have diverted resources and attention away from basic
intelligence and database maintenance, to support current operations too long.” 
Counterintelligence.  Allegations that U.S. classified information regarding design
of missile warheads may have been provided to Chinese officials by a scientist at the Los
Alamos National Laboratory (part of the Energy Department) led to charges of  lax security
especially in regard to visits by foreign nationals.  An Intelligence Community damage
assessment, released  in April 1999, concluded that China obtained by espionage classified
U.S. nuclear weapons information that “probably accelerated” its program to develop future
nuclear weapons.  According to the assessment, China obtained at least basic design
information on several modern U.S. nuclear reentry vehicles, including the Trident II (W88).
 A report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial
Concerns with the People’s Republic of China concluded that U.S. information accelerated
Chinese nuclear weapon modernization and “helped the PRC in its efforts to fabricate and
successfully test its next generation of nuclear weapons designs.  These warheads give the
PRC small, modern thermonuclear warheads roughly equivalent to current U.S. warhead
yields.”  
(For additional information, see CRS Report RL30143, China: Suspected Acquisition
of U.S. Nuclear Weapon Data, by Shirley A. Kan and CRS Report RL30220, China’s
Technology Acquisitions: Cox Committee’s Report—Findings, Issues and Recommendations.
For more recent developments, see CRS Report RL30569,  Department of Energy: Status
of Legislated Security and Counterintelligence Measures, by Jonathan Medalia.)
Reflecting concern about shortcomings in the investigation of potential espionage against
Energy Department laboratories, amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) were included in the Senate version of the FY2001 Intelligence Authorization bill
(H.R. 4392) to establish specific provisions for the review by the Attorney General of
requests for surveillance and searches under FISA.  The legislation would also encourage
closer cooperation between the FBI and national security agencies.  Title VI of the resulting
Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2001 (P.L. 106-567) included provisions designed to
enhance the FBI’s capabilities to undertake counterintelligence investigations and authorized
$7 million in additional funding for FY2001.
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In light of the arrest in February 2001of FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen for suspicion
of espionage on behalf of the former Soviet Union and Russia, Congress is expected to
monitor the results of the judicial processes and undertake its own review of
counterintelligence efforts.  Some observers advocate more extensive use of polygraph testing
of U.S. intelligence officials while others criticize the reliability of such tests.
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